In obedience to the feeling of reality, we shall insist that, in the analysis of propositions, nothing 'unreal' is to be admitted. But, after all, if there is nothing unreal, how, it may be asked, could we admit anything unreal? The reply is that, in dealing with propositions, we are dealing in the first instance with symbols, and if we attribute significance to groups of symbols which have no significance, we shall fall into the error of admitting unrealities, in the only sense in which this is possible, namely, as objects described.

For want of the apparatus of propositional functions, many logicians have been driven to the conclusion that there are unreal objects. It is argued, e.g., by M…

It is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing it true.

The question of 'unreality,' which confronts us at this point, is a very important one. Misled by grammar, the great majority of those logicians who have dealt…

I cannot get from the nature of the proposition to the individual logical operations!!! That is, I cannot bring out how far the proposition is the picture of t…

The tendency has always been strong to believe that whatever received a name must be an entity or thing, having an independent existence of its own; and if no …

What should we gain by a definition, as it can only lead us to other undefined terms? (p. 26)