49 Ludwig Wittgenstein Quotes on Language

Ludwig Wittgenstein quotes on language

2. I cannot get from the nature of the proposition to the individual logical operations!!! That is, I cannot bring out how far the proposition is the picture of the situation. I am almost inclined to give up all my efforts. (p. 41)

11. That all elementary props are given is SHOWN by there being none having an elementary sense which is not given.

13. The whole sense of the book might be summed up the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.

18. The thought is the significant proposition. (4)

20. It is quite impossible for a proposition to state that it itself is true. (4.442)

22. Propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. (An elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.) (5)

24. The limits of my language mean the limits of my world. (5.6)

25. Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but not that.' For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well. We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either. (5.61)

26. This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. (5.62)

32. There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical. (6.522)

33. My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) (6.54)

34. Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, daruber muss man schweigen.

35. A proposition is completely logically analyzed if its grammar is made clear in no matter what idiom. Part I(1)

36. The idea that in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term one had to find the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical investigation; for it has not only led to no result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone could have helped him understand the usage of the general term. (p. 19)

37. For remember that in general we don't use language according to strict rules - it hasn't been taught us by means of strict rules, either. (p. 25)

38. What should we gain by a definition, as it can only lead us to other undefined terms? (p. 26)

39. But ordinary language is all right. (p. 28)

41. What I give is the morphology of the use of an expression. I show that it has kinds of uses of which you had not dreamed. In philosophy one feels forced to look at a concept in a certain way. What I do is suggest, or even invent, other ways of looking at it. I suggest possibilities of which you had not previously thought. You thought that there was one possibility, or only two at most. But I made you think of others. Furthermore, I made you see that it was absurd to expect the concept to conform to those narrow possibilities.

44. The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway. (p.187)

45. Philosophers are often like little children, who first scribble random lines on a piece of paper with their pencils, and now ask an adult 'What is that?' (p.193)

46. Uttering a word is like striking a note on the keyboard of the imagination. #6

47. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of our language. #109

48. What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. #116

49. What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stood. #118

50. Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words. #120

53. 'Everything is already there in....' How does it come about that [an] arrow points ? Doesn't it seem to carry in it something besides itself? - 'No, not the dead line on paper; only the psychical thing, the meaning, can do that.' - That is both true and false. The arrow points only in the application that a living being makes of it. (454)

54. My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense. (464)

55. But if you say: 'How am I to know what he means, when I see nothing but the signs he gives?' then I say: 'How is he to know what he means, when he has nothing but the signs either?' (504)

56. What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - forms of life.

59. If a lion could talk, we could not understand him (II, xi; p. 223 of the 1968 English edn.)

68. 370. But more correctly: The fact that I use the word 'hand' and all the other words in my sentence without a second thought, indeed that I should stand before the abyss if I wanted so much as to try doubting their meanings - shows that absence of doubt belongs to the essence of the language-game, that the question 'How do I know...' drags out the language-game, or else does away with it.

74. Philosophers often behave like little children who scribble some marks on a piece of paper at random and then ask the grown-up 'What's that?' - It happened like this: the grown-up had drawn pictures for the child several times and said 'this is a man,' 'this is a house,' etc. And then the child makes some marks too and asks: what's this then? (p. 17e)

77. Kierkegaard writes: If Christianity were so easy and cozy, why should God in his Scriptures have set Heaven and Earth in motion and threatened eternal punishments? - Question: But then in that case why is this Scriptures so unclear? (p. 31e)

87. Don't for heaven's sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must pay attention to your nonsense. (p. 56e)

88. Animals come when their names are called. Just like human beings. (p. 67e)

89. It's only by thinking even more crazily than philosophers do that you can solve their problems. (p. 75e)

100. Hot Ziggety!

101. I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again 'I know that that's a tree', pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell them: 'This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy.' (p. 578)

104. A new word is like a fresh seed sown on the ground of the discussion.

107. At the end of reasons comes persuasion.

109. For a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word meaning it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

111. For I am a bear of very little brain and long words bother me.

115. If there were a verb meaning 'to believe falsely,' it would not have any significant first person, present indicative.

116. If we spoke a different language, we would perceive a somewhat different world.

117. In order to be able to set a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought). (preface, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)

121. Language is a part of our organism and no less complicated than it.

122. Like everything metaphysical the harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language.

130. The limits of my language are the limits of my mind. All I know is what I have words for.

134. There are remarks that sow and remarks that reap.