3 Noam Chomsky Quotes on Military strategy

Noam Chomsky quotes on military strategy

93. ...obviously the Serbs had contingency plans, as every sane person knew. The US has contingency plans to invade Canada. Israel has contingency plans to expel Palestinians, and few sane people doubt that they would carry them out if under attack. That's what military planners do for a living. [...] In that book I reviewed the kind of material selected from the OSCE report by the Irish TV announcer, but also reviewed the material that would have been selected by his exact counterpart in Belgrade, and the full conclusions.

121. If the country had been flooded with several 100,000 troops, as Shinseki advised, and if the orders had not been so grotesque (stand by quietly while the cultural wealth of Iraq, and humanity, was destroyed in a way reminiscent of the Mongol invasion; treat the population with contempt and brutality; allow the society to reconstruct instead of imposing ultra-liberal measures bound to destroy it, etc.), then the place might have been pacified as well as northern Europe was under the Nazis -- or the Philippines, after a decade of extreme brutality, victory having been declared repeatedly during those years. Just how one judges such an outcome depends on other choices.

157. ...immediately after the 1954 Geneva Accords on a peaceful settlement for Indochina, which Washington refused to accept, the National Security Council secretly decreed that even in the case of 'local Communist subversion or rebellion NOT CONSTITUTING ARMED ATTACK' (my emphasis) the US would consider the use of military force, including an attack on China if it is 'determined to be the source' of the 'subversion'; the NSC also called for converting Thailand into 'the focal point of U.S. covert and psychological operations in Southeast Asia,' undertaking 'covert operations on a large and effective scale' throughout Indochina, and in general, acting forcefully to undermine the Accords and the UN Charter. The wording, repeated verbatim annually in planning documents, was chosen so as to make explicit the US right to violate Article 51 of the Charter, which permits the use of force only in immediate self-defense against 'armed attack.' The US proceeded to define 'aggression' to include 'political warfare, or subversion,' what UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson called 'internal aggression' while defending JFK's escalation in South Vietnam. US attacks were therefore transmuted into 'self-defense' against 'internal aggression.' When the US bombed Libyan cities in 1986, the official justification was 'self defense against future attack,' a ludicrous distortion of the Charter applauded by legal specialists in the national press. The US invasion of Panama was defended in the Security Council by appeal to Article 51, which, US Ambassador Pickering declared, 'provides for the use of armed force to defend a country, to defend our interests and our people,' and permits the U.S. to invade Panama to prevent its 'territory from being used as a base for smuggling drugs into the United States' -- an astonishing concept of 'armed attack,' which passed without criticism. In June 1993, when Clinton launched a missile attack on Baghdad, killing civilians, UN Ambassador Albright appealed to Article 51, explaining that the bombing was in 'self-defense against armed attack' -- namely, an alleged attempt to assassinate former president Bush two months earlier. The claim would have been remarkable even if the US had had credible evidence of Iraqi involvement, which, officials conceded, they did not. These and innumerable other examples illustrate far-reaching contempt for the rule of law. The US has always relied on the rule of force in international affairs. International law, treaties, the World Court, War Crimes Tribunals, moral judgment, etc., are regularly invoked against enemies, often quite accurately.